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 Melvin I. Urofsky. A Mind of One Piece: Brandeis and American
 Reform. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. Pp. xiii + 210, bibl.
 index, $10.00.
 Ten years ago, when most American historians still wrote from a
 basically New Deal perspective, they seemed to accept as both inevitable
 and desirable a society dominated by big business, big government, and
 big labor. They saw the federal regulatory commission as the adminis-
 trative instrument through which the government would protect the
 public interest and keep the machinery of society working smoothly. In
 1967 Richard Hofstadter pronounced earlier trust-busting sentiments an
 "old romance" and pointed to the development of antitrust law into a
 highly technical and relatively effective method of policing the
 large-scale corporations that had come by the fifties to be taken for
 granted.' In such an atmosphere Louis Dembitz Brandeis often seemed
 an anachronism-brilliant and admirable, to be sure, but still a
 throwback to the economic beliefs of the nineteenth century.
 The publication of the Letters of Louis D. Brandeis is a major
 contribution to scholarship and is especially timely when there is a new
 questioning of the economic and political wisdom of the cold war years.
 The changes of the past half-century have inevitably made many of
 Brandeis's ideas and proposals seem obsolete, but the values he
 defended and the problems he confronted have taken on a new
 relevance. There is a danger in bigness. Democratic values are more
 fundamental than the demands of corporate, technological convenience.
 Big government regulation of big business does not guarantee political
 freedom, economic security, or the common good. What was perhaps
 Brandeis's essential concern is even more fundamental at the present
 time than it was in the years before World War I. "In a democracy," he
 declared in 1913, "it is the part of statesmanship to prevent the
 development of power which overawes the ordinary forces of man.' '2
 That concern goes to the heart of the question of what type of society
 we wish America to be and what type of society we have made it.
 Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy have been at work on the
 Letters since 1964, drawing extensively on the Brandeis materials at the
 University of Louisville, searching out correspondence in other manu-
 script collections, and obtaining a number of items in private hands.
 The first two volumes, handsomely published by the State University of
 New York Press, cover the period from 1870 to 1912, with the great
 bulk of the letters written in the years after 1900. The editors have
 done an excellent job in selection and have provided enlightening and
 highly detailed notes which supply background information and refer-
 ences to other relevant sources. Compiling such material is often sheer
 drudgery, but the final result is an admirable and highly useful piece of
 work. When the final three volumes are completed, the Letters of Louis
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 D. Brandeis will stand as a major source in twentieth century American
 history.
 The volumes contain a wealth of information about politics during
 the Progressive period, revealing nuances of many of its great battles-the
 New Haven merger fight, the Ballinger-Pinchot affair, and the campaigns
 of 1912. Perhaps of greatest importance the letters reveal Brandeis the
 social reformer, not just his ideas and his struggles, but his periodic ups
 and downs and his shrewd orchestration of reform efforts. Brandeis was
 a tactician who selected his point of attack, elaborated his tentative
 solution, and proceeded to organize, inspire, drive, and even goad his
 forces until they had carried the day or until the fight was finally lost.
 And though a battle might be lost, he continually insisted that the
 future promised new opportunities. Awe-inspiring knowledge of the
 problems involved, the determined pursuit of influential politicians who
 seemed reachable, persistent and intelligent use of the public press, and
 tactful cooperation with diverse allies were his reliable instruments to be
 used in whatever combination seemed most likely to succeed. Brandeis
 was in contact, at one time or another, with most of the major reform
 leaders of the day, with prominent citizens, businessmen, labor leaders,
 publishers, and writers, and with politicians ranging from minor
 Massachusetts officials to Theodore Roosevelt, Robert LaFollette, and
 Woodrow Wilson.
 Not satisfied with initial success when a proposal he supported
 became law, Brandeis persistently turned his attention to the staffing of
 commissions and the practical problems of implementation. After his
 success in getting the Massachusetts legislature to establish his plan for
 savings bank life insurance, for example, he immediately began work on
 getting the proper men appointed to the board of trustees to ensure the
 plan's practical success. When the board was completed, all the new
 appointees were among those whom Brandeis had recommended (Vol. I,
 p. 591). In spite of inevitable gaps, the letters trace well the evolution
 of his reform interests, the refinement of his tactics, and the growth of
 his personal prestige, influence, and confidence.
 The letters equally document Brandeis's legendary knowledge of the
 most complicated and abstruse economic issues, and they suggest the
 political sources of that approach. Factual mastery was congenial to his
 mind, and his legal experience had shown him the great utility of fully
 understanding economic problems. His reform efforts, however, made
 fact mastery an absolute necessity.
 Brandeis was the prototype of a new kind of reformer in American
 history, one who operated in a new context and employed new tools.
 Until the late nineteenth century America had lacked powerful
 centralizing institutions and had remained a relatively unstructured
 society. While Americans shared many things, perhaps above all a vague
 democratic ideology, they belonged to a nation of localities. Political,
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 economic, and social power was diffuse. During the last thirty years of
 the century economic productivity and organization expanded at a
 dizzying rate, and by 1900 the private business corporation had
 emerged as the dominant structural fact in America. Power had become
 nationalized; it had become centralized; it had become bureaucratized.
 Gradually, from a variety of motives, other forces rallied, attempting
 to redress the radical imbalance that had developed in the structure of
 power. Some laws were passed; some reforms achieved. Brandeis was
 part of the first generation that confronted that new structure. Among
 his tools were a highly disorganized but occasionally effective public
 opinion and a handful of rather vague local and national laws. While
 Brandeis supported various kinds of reform attempts, he devoted much
 of his time to making available laws serve practical, concrete reform
 ends. With such tools, and against such an opposition, the complete
 mastery of economic, financial, and political facts seemed the essential
 prerequisite for achieving any kind of popular social change.
 The new men of organized wealth were insiders. They could make
 decisions in relative privacy and then carry them out. They had the
 power to build and buy and do. Brandeis conversely was institutionally
 an outsider. He had no power himself, and he had to act through public
 opinion and legislatures, usually reacting rather than initiating. He was
 an outsider, too, in that the crucial facts on which legal and political
 decisions ought to be made were often in private hands and difficult or
 impossible to obtain. He could dispute the Boston Elevated Railroad
 Company, or Charles S. Mellon of the New Haven, or even President
 Taft only if he could get enough facts to overcome the advantages of
 money, power, and control of information that those on the inside
 possessed.
 Brandeis's personal tenacity and his devotion to the mastery of facts
 enabled him to succeed where others would have failed. His efforts, too,
 threw into clear relief the extent to which the new economic and
 political structure in the United States was converting most Americans
 into institutional outsiders and making it extremely difficult for those
 who would attempt to defend the interests of the public or of the
 consumer.
 While an outsider to the bureaucratic institutions he battled, Brandeis
 considered himself the representative of the true public interest, a
 "public private citizen" (Vol. II, p. 725). He remained throughout his
 life committed to private property, profit, and even, on occasion,
 certain kinds of "bigness" in economic organization. He criticized his
 fellow reformers when they seemed to be "fanatics, & as ready to do
 injustice to capital as the capitalists have been ready to do injustice to
 the people" (Vol. I, p. 437). Brandeis viewed himself as a "conserva-
 tive" who was attempting to secure the communal well being. That
 strong personal sense of belonging-of upholding traditional values, of
This content downloaded from 208.67.210.24 on Wed, 05 Dec 2018 15:01:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PURCELL / Brandeis and the Democratic Vision 257
 fighting for the whole community, and of profoundly belonging to both
 New England and America-perhaps provided the strength necessary to
 sustain him in the role of institutional outsider.
 The greatest disappointment with the collection, as the editors readily
 acknowledge, is that it fails to add significantly to our understanding of
 Brandeis's legal career and thought. This is probably due in large part to
 the refusal of Brandeis's old law firm to allow the editors to use, or
 even inspect, the materials in its possession. Brandeis was little
 interested in jurisprudential speculation and chose not to discuss his
 cases in his personal correspondence. References to even such an
 important and public case as Muller v. Oregon appear in only half a
 dozen letters, and they are invariably brief and unenlightening. There
 are a handful of interesting comments hidden away, and some
 discussion of a few legal problems that bore directly on political issues
 (such as the labor injunction), but they add little to what is already
 known about Brandeis as lawyer and judge.
 In spite of that shortcoming, the letters do suggest the ways in which
 his reform experience informed his brand of sociological jurisprudence.
 While Holmes came to his legal theory largely through intellectual
 influences, Brandeis arrived at his through political ones. His knowledge
 of social and economic realities not only highlighted the aridity of
 many legal formulas, but it also convinced him that he could turn such
 abstractions to his own use. To the extent that liberty of contract was
 an abstraction, he could, with sufficient factual support, infuse into it
 his own concrete meaning. Brandeis was perceptive as well as legally
 shrewd when he cited Lochner v. New York as his major precedent in
 arguing Muller v. Oregon.
 Additionally, the problems he faced in fighting the corporations
 immediately suggested to him the instrumental nature of law. Unlike
 defenders of the corporate structure, to whom legal language easily
 translated into analytically vague but socially serviceable ideology, the
 outsider who challenged those inside a bureaucracy sought practical
 leverage through which to change things. Brandeis needed to force legal
 institutions to alter business practice rather than use them to obscure
 what already existed. The law necessarily appeared a tool.
 Concerned with Brandeis's role in American politics, Professor
 Urofsky has drawn on his extensive research as coeditor of the Letters
 to write a series of interpretive essays dealing with some of the major
 aspects of Brandeis's career. A Mind of One Piece: Brandeis and
 American Reform is a useful introduction to his life and thought, often
 suggestive and perceptive. Urofsky succeeds well in laying open the
 inner coherence of Brandeis's outlook, revealing the values that
 consistently informed his work and capturing many of the characteristic
 shadings of his mind. He sheds light, for example, on Brandeis's often
 ignored commitment to Zionism and convincingly argues that it grew
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 from his belief that the ideals of Zionism paralleled the ideals of
 American progressivism, rather than from any initial sense of Jewish
 identity or religion.
 Urofsky suggests that a handful of individuals, such as Brandeis and
 Jane Addams, were crucial to progressive success. Because of their
 personal prestige, unflagging energy, and diverse political connections,
 the author maintains, such individuals served as "linchpins" which
 "helped hold together that amorphous mixture of reformers and ideas
 and uplift we have termed progressivism" (p. 167). Such an
 interpretation flows readily from the Letters and clearly pinpoints one
 of the characteristics of progressive politics. Urofsky, however, threatens
 to push it too far when he declares that "reform, after all, is not
 primarily a social or institutional phenomenon, but the collective result
 of many individual efforts" (p. 167). That the individual reformer was
 crucial is certain, but, as with any other historical "cause," the reformer
 must be seen in a complete social and institutional context. Urofsky
 would surely not deny that; and his reemphasis on the individual, taken
 with a certain caution, is welcome.
 While his essays are generally sympathetic, Urofsky maintains that the
 antitrust program Brandeis and Wilson advocated in 1912 was doomed
 to fail because it "attempted the impossible: to turn back historical
 progress" (p. 80). Comparing that antitrust policy to Jackson's assault
 on the Bank of the United States, the author concludes that "it was an
 exercise in futility; the conditions that made the trusts possible also
 guaranteed their continuance" (p. 79). While pointing to the love
 Americans have for bigness and "the facts of economic reality,"
 however, Urofsky does not specify exactly which conditions "guar-
 anteed" that continuance, to what extent those conditions were
 technological and to what extent political, and whether some or all of
 them could possibly have been changed.
 And though he indicates that Wilson did not fully understand
 Brandeis's goals, Urofsky does not discuss the significance of Wilson's
 weak, probusiness appointees to the Federal Trade Commission. Those
 appointees scuttled the new FTC and destroyed whatever chance it had
 to enforce the antitrust laws along Brandeisian lines. It was thus
 politics, not technological inevitability, that frustrated the commission's
 reform potential. Brandeis, who always thought in terms of practical
 implementation, was bitterly disappointed. "It was a stupid administra-
 tion," he later commented.3
 Finally, even if one accepts, as Urofsky apparently does, the
 economic inevitability of giant corporations, that does not mean that
 the existing corporate structure itself is historically or economically
 unavoidable. It might be possible, for example, to have industrial
 giantism but with a different social and financial structure of ownership
 and control.
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 Urofsky rightly points out that Brandeis, in spite of his factual
 orientation, was more a moralist than an economic technician. This,
 however, does not mean that his hostility to corporate size and
 dominance was misguided, unless one assumes that there was only one
 "efficient" solution to the problem of economic organization and that
 politicomoral values must be subordinated to that solution. Probably
 neither Professor Urofsky nor most scholars would accept those two
 assumptions, and yet until recently the work of most historians has
 dismissed Brandeis's economic goals as impractical. Very possibly they
 are impractical in an immediate political sense, but that does not mean
 that they are impractical forever or necessarily. The fact that they
 might well be practicable, but have never been given a real chance at
 implementation, surely tells us more about America than does any
 assumption of the ineluctible progress of economic and financial
 centralization.
 Perhaps part of the reason for ignoring Brandeis's economic ideas has
 been the focus on such terms as "trusts" and "monopolies." Those
 words served a largely rhetorical purpose and, since World War II, seem
 quaint. To Brandeis, however, they described real entities and real
 economic practices. When he criticized the New Haven, or the United
 Shoe Company, or J. P. Morgan's control of credit, he had specific
 examples of behavior in mind that were restrictive, unfair, and socially
 harmful-in his words, "monopolistic." Brandeis attacked bigness as a
 "curse," but he was no dogmatist. Rather he continually asked one
 fundamental question: what impact does any particular organization or
 practice have on the lives, freedoms, and dignity of individuals? When
 the consolidation of economic efforts seemed to promise real advantages
 in working toward some popular, democratic goal, he could approve
 them. But always he asked for their full human meaning.
 To fully evaluate Brandeis's significance, therefore, it is necessary to
 get behind his language and face the crucial political problem that he
 persistently confronted: the dangerous threat that private, concentrated
 wealth and power pose to democratic freedoms. The real question is not
 of "monopoly," either as rhetoric or pure theoretical reality, but of
 inordinate power exerted by a few over the lives of all and the politics
 of the nation. Brandeis's commitment to small-unit economics may need
 major qualification; his concern for entrepreneurial opportunities for the
 individual may well speak to another age. His conviction that the
 individual should control his own life and participate in an open and
 meaningful democratic process, however, speaks fully to the present.
 Regardless of the minor successes and major failures of national
 antitrust policy, the central danger that worried Brandeis still plagues
 America. In articulating the idea that political freedom and the
 widespread dispersal of economic power are intimately related, he
 reminds us of one of the cardinal principles in republican political
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 theory that traces back to the Federalist Papers, Locke, Harrington, and
 beyond, a principle that many Americans have found it convenient to
 proclaim outmoded. Fortunately, Brandeis's voice still rings clear:
 political freedom and individual dignity are primary values, and
 economic organization in a true democracy must be adapted to them.
 Edward A. Purcell, Jr.
 Department of History
 University of Missouri-Columbia
 Professor Purcell is the autbor of The Crisis of Democratic Theory:
 Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value (Lexington: The
 University Press of Kentucky, 1973), winner of the Organization of
 American Historians' Frederick Jackson Turner Prize in 1972.
 1. Richard Hofstadter, "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" in The Paranoid Style
 in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 188.
 2. Quoted in Alpheus Thomas Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life (New York: The Viking
 Press, 1946), p. 419.
 3. Quoted in Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York: Harper &
 Row, 1963, paperback ed.), p. 74.
 JUSTICE OR WELFARE?
 VARIATIONS ON THE
 PROGRESSIVE THEME
 Clarke A. Chambers. Paul U. Kellogg and the Survey: Voices for Social
 Welfare and Social Justice. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
 1971. Pp. xii + 283, illus., index, $10.00.
 Daniel Levine. Jane Addams and the Liberal Tradition. Madison: State
 Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971. Pp. xviii + 277, bibl., index,
 $8.50.
 These two biographies are presented as case studies of the influence of
 two of the most important intellectual figures of the Progressive Era.
 Because they purport to deal with the question of intellectual influence,
 both books attempt to set their subject within the general framework of
 the Progressive movement and then try to trace the relationship
 between each individual's particular brand of progressivism and the
 political movements of the period from the New Deal to the New
 Frontier. This task is one to test the skills of the most talented
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